A Secrecy Primer
As more countries acquire the scientific knowledge to build nuclear weapons, the U.S. response
should not be heightened secrecy but a renewed commitment to strengthening political
safeguards.

David Hafemeister
Secrecy is in the air. Last July, the Los Alamos National Laboratory, still recovering from the
Wen Ho Lee “Chinese espionage” controversy, shut down classified work for 10 weeks after two
computer disks containing sensitive material were reported missing. Some 12,000 personnel
remained idle during a lengthy investigation that in the end revealed the two computer disks
hadn't even existed–bar codes for the disks had been created and inventoried, but never used.
Alternatively, anyone with a credit card and a casual interest in the secrets of bomb-making
could have visited Amazon.com and purchased for $34.95 (plus shipping) The Los Alamos
Primer: The First Lectures on How to Build an Atomic Bomb. The curious history of the Los
Alamos Primer–a history in which I played a very small part–in itself offers a worthwhile primer
on the evolving nature of secrecy in the nuclear age and on the need to develop political
instruments to cope with the inevitable dissemination of knowledge and technology.
In April 1943, Robert Serber, a protegé of J. Robert Oppenheimer, gave a series of five lectures
on atomic physics to the new hires at Los Alamos. “The object,” declared the young physicist,
“is to produce a practical military weapon in the form of a bomb in which the energy is released
by a fast neutrino chain reaction in one or more of the materials known to show nuclear fission.”
Topics ranged from fast neutron reactions to the probability of predetonation. The lecture notes,
which for years were mimeographed and passed around among Los Alamos scientists, became
known as the Los Alamos Primer, or LA-1, the first classified report on nuclear weapons at the
laboratory. The Primer remained a Top Secret document until 1965, when it was entirely
declassified. Serber stated that declassifying LA-1 was natural because “the information it
contains had by then become publicly available in other sources.”
Others would later disagree. In 1977, as special assistant to the undersecretary of state for arms
control, I was working on nuclear nonproliferation in the Carter State Department. I learned that
Sen. John Glenn, Democrat of Ohio, would be chairing hearings on the transfer of basic physics
designs to the Middle East. One item on the agenda was U.S. government sales of nuclear
documents (such as LA-1) that were advertised in the catalogs of the National Technical
Information Service (NTIS), which was created in 1950 as a federal clearinghouse to disseminate
scientific and engineering information. I called nuclear-weapon designer Theodore Taylor–who
had left Los Alamos in 1956 to devote his work to safeguards on peaceful applications of nuclear
power–and asked him how useful LA-1 was for beginning weapons design. Not only was it
useful, he said, but something should be done to stop the government from this dangerous
practice. As the State Department point-person on this issue, I arranged an interagency meeting
with NTIS director Bill Knox. He reminded me that we couldn't destroy all copies of declassified
papers like LA-1, since the 1966 Freedom of Information Act requires the government to respond

to requests for any documents that have been declassified. But the director did agree that NTIS
would cease advertising LA-1 in its catalogs. Short of burning books, this idea seemed the best
outcome, and I considered the case closed.
I forgot about LA-1 until 1992, when I saw an ad in the Bulletin and elsewhere for the Los
Alamos Primer. The new version offered additional editorial comments from Serber and
contained updated parameters, such as the correct critical masses for uranium and plutonium. I
immediately called Taylor and asked him about the seriousness of the reborn LA-1. This time,
Taylor's response was less apocalyptic. The Primer's equations were by now too well-known to
be of great concern, he said.
In retrospect, Taylor was correct, as LA-1 is a series of back-of-the-envelope calculations that
had become common fare in the physics community. One does not expect great accuracy from
these calculations and one does not learn the most serious secrets, which are the engineering
tricks and manufacturing processes that make nuclear weapons small, reliable, and predictable.
Taylor's change in perspective between 1977 and 1992 highlights a central dynamic of nuclear
weapons research: Technical barriers to the bomb inevitably decrease over time as secrets
become more widespread. And new technologies, in such areas as uranium enrichment, have
made it easier to obtain weapon-grade materials. South Africa elegantly developed the helicon
jet-nozzle process (an alternative to using a centrifuge), spending a total of only $300 million
with 1,000 employees to produce six nuclear weapons during 1980-1990. This effort cost
considerably less than the Manhattan Project ($25 billion with 40,000 employees) and the
unsuccessful Iraqi nuclear weapons program ($10 billion with 7,000 employees).
But accepting the proliferation of knowledge is not an argument in favor of actively
disseminating it; not to mention publishing high-quality, how-to-build-bombs manuals. In that
context, I believe that physicist Hans Bethe and others were correct–on the basis of what was
then known to have been declassified–in opposing the publication of Howard Morland's article,
“The H-Bomb Secret,” in the November 1979 Progressive. (Taylor was shocked by the
erroneous declassification of UCRL-4725–the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory report
that was the basis for the article–referring to it as “the most serious break of security I am aware
[of] in this country's post-World War II nuclear weapons [development] programs.”) For his part,
Progressive editor Erwin Knoll justified publication by noting: “We hope the debate over [‘The
H-Bomb Secret’] will be a beginning of a process in which all of the nuclear policies pursued by
our Government will be held up to public scrutiny and review.” I wish I could agree with this
sentiment, but can Morland and his supporters offer any substantive examples of how this article
has advanced the debate over nuclear weapons in the 26 years since it was published?
Yet, while I disagreed with the Progressive's decision, I share the belief that excessive secrecy in
the name of national security has often stifled public debate over critical issues. For instance,
overclassification prevented a full vetting of the seismic data from 1988 to 1990 that allowed the
United States to charge the Soviets with a “likely violation” of the Threshold Test Ban Treaty,
which prohibited nuclear underground tests with a yield exceeding 150 kilotons. This deliberate
false charge prevented the United States from following Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev's
call for a nuclear moratorium in the late 1980s. Moreover, closed government bodies, such as the

Pentagon's Defense Science Board and the Energy Department's National Nuclear Security
Administration, often fail the nation by not being critical when the physics, economics, and
strategic underpinnings of projects are untenable. Classification keeps bad science hidden from
public view. Case in point is the proposed orbiting “Star Wars” Excalibur X-ray laser project that
cost taxpayers $900 million between 1984 and 1989, yet never materialized.
So while the spread of potentially dangerous scientific knowledge is a legitimate concern, the
knee-jerk response should not be more secrecy. Instead, as the technical barriers to the bomb
continue to shrink, it is incumbent upon the United States to strengthen political barriers. The
United States should ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, and it should strongly reaffirm
its 1995 pledge not to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon states that are members
of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Washington cannot expect other nations to play
by global proliferation rules if it does not fulfill this basic promise to the 183 non-nuclear
weapon states that renewed the NPT indefinitely.
Technological advances have not rendered these diplomatic initiatives moot. If anything, history
has shown that the two trends can be mutually reinforcing. There is little doubt, for example, that
President Dwight D. Eisenhower's “Atoms for Peace” program accelerated nuclear proliferation.
The United States trained Indian scientists in plutonium foundry practices, helping India to build
its first plutonium nuclear weapon. Iran hid its nuclear weapons program behind its peaceful
nuclear power program while working on uranium enrichment. However, this pessimistic story is
not the full story. Atoms for Peace paved the way for the almost universally accepted (albeit
imperfect) nonproliferation regime, with the NPT and the International Atomic Energy Agency
as its linchpins. Without this regime the planet would be in far worse shape. Can the regime be
improved? Yes, with luck. Atoms for Peace gave us the long-term political barriers that are more
important than the near-term losses. Hopefully, the United States will summon the political will
to cut those losses even further.

